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TAX LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN TAX LAW 
A. I.R.C. Section 104(a)(2) and Awards For Defamation 
In Roemer v. C.I.R.1 the Ninth Circuit held, in reserving the 
decision of the tax court,1I that compensatory and punitive dam-
ages awarded in taxpayers' defamation suit were excludable 
from gross income under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).3 
In 1965, Paul F. Roemer: an insurance broker, applied for 
an agency license from Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company to 
sell life insurance. In the course of reviewing the application, 
Penn Mutual obtained a creditor report on Roemer prepared by 
Retail Credit Company. The credit report was clearly defama-
tory.1I Upon learning of the defamatory report, Roemer de-
manded a retraction. However, the purported retraction con-
tained further defamatory statements about Roemer's general 
business and personal character and about his fitness as an in-
surance agent. Based on the Retail Credit's report, Penn Mutual 
denied Roemer's application to an agency license. 
Roemer sued Retail Credit for libel under section 45 of the 
California Civil Code.8 Roemer alleged that Retail Credit pub-
1. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); (per Alarcon, J.; the other panel members were 
Canby and Reinhardt, JJ.). 
2. 70 T.e. 390 (1983), (per Dowson, J.; Forrester, J., Korner, J., and Wilbur J., 
dissenting). 
3. Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "the amount of any damages re-
ceived (whether by suit or agreement on account of personal injuries or sickness)." 
4. Marcia E. Roemer was a party to the proceeding solely because she filed a joint 
tax return with her husband. 716 F.2d at 694. 
5. Id. at 695. The credit report falsely stated that Roemer was ignorant in insurance 
matters, neglected his clients' affairs, was recently fired from his position as president of 
the insurance firm, and intentionally defaced property belonging to others. The report 
also implied that Roemer misappropriated funds and questioned Roemer's honesty. Id. 
6. California Civil Code section 45 provides that "Libel is a false and unprivileged 
publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye, 
which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which has a ten-
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lished false statements intending to damage his reputation, and 
to injure him in his business profession and occupation.7 At trial, 
the jury awarded Roemer $40,000 in compensatory damages and 
$250,000 in punitive damages, together with costs. s The jury 
made no indication whether the damages were awarded as com-
pensation for injury to Roemer's personal or professional 
reputation. 
Roemer received his damage award in 1975. His total net 
recovery was $147,140.9 On his federal income tax return, Roe-
mer reported $16,020 of the damage portion of the recovery as 
income.lo The Commissioner determined that the entire award 
should have been included in gross income with a deduction for 
all costs and attorneys fees because the injury was primarily to 
Roemer's professional reputation. 
Initially, the Tax Court decided that, in determining the ap-
plicability of section 104(a)(2), a distinction should be drawn be-
tween defamatory injury to personal reputation and defamatory 
injury to an individual's business or professional reputation, to 
the extent it affects that individual's income. The Tax Court de-
termined that the taxability of a damage award depended on the 
actual basis of recovery. Therefore, the court held that the com-
pensatory damages were excludable from gross income to the ex-
tent that the taxpaYf;!r could establish that the amounts recov-
ered for damages resulted from injury to personal reputation. 
7. 716 F.2d at 695. 
8. The jury was not instructed to, and gave no indication of the basis upon which 
they arrived at the amount of the award, nor was the jury instructed to allocate the 
award between the injury to Roemer's personal or professional reputation. [d. 
9. 70 T.C. 390, 403 n.2. The net recovery was calculated as follows: 
Compensatory damages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $40,000 
Punitive damages ..................................... $250,000 
Interests and Costs ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $85,601 
$375,601 
Less 
Attorneys' Fees ....................................... $220,710 
Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,751 
$228,461 
Net to Roemer $147,140 
10. Roemer also reported $7,751 for costs and $23,371 for interest received as in-
come. In his amended petition to the Tax Court, Roemer alleged that $16,020 of the 
damage portion·of the award and $7,751 for costs were incorrectly reported'on ihis 1975 
tax return. 
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Since the evidence from the trial tended to show that the com-
pensatory damages awarded Roemer were for injury to his pro-
fessional reputation and the jury had not been instructed to 
make an allocation between personal and professional elements 
of the damage award, the Tax Court concluded that the whole 
award was taxable. Thus, having determined that the compensa-
tory damages were not excludable under section 104 (a)(2), the 
Tax Court also concluded that the punitive damages were in-
cludable in gross income. 11 
In reversing the Tax Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the Tax Court improperly distinguished physical from 
non-physical personal injuries in determining the applicability 
of section 104(a)(2). The court noted that when an individual 
receives a damage award for a physical personal injury, the 
whole amount of the award would be excludable under section 
104(a)(2), even though the predominant result of the injury was 
the loss of income. However, when a nonphysical injury, such as 
defamation, results in an award for economic and non-economic 
losses, the majority in the Tax Court would view the whole 
award as taxable, except to the extent that the individual could 
show that a portion of the award was received for non-economic 
personal injury. The Ninth Circuit perceived the proper distinc-
tion as whether the injuries were personal or non personal, since 
section 104(a)(2) excludes damages received for a personal 
injury. 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the issue of the taxabil-
ity of Roemer's award could be resolved by analyzing the nature 
of the tort of defamation as it developed under California law. II 
After examining the historical development of the law of defa-
mation, the court observed that under the California Civil 
11. In a footnote, the Tax Court implied that since under California law punitive 
damages are imposed against a defendant to warn others not to engage in the same con-
duct .or behavior (Cal. Civ. Code sec. 3294) and relate to the defendant's oppression, 
fraud, and malice, that by statute they can never be directly related to personal injuries 
suffered by a plaintiff, and by implication not excludable under section 104(a)(2). 70 T.C. 
390, 408 n.4. 
12. As the Ninth Circuit noted when there is no controlling federal law, or control-
ling definitions in the tax code, the court must analyze the nature of the claim litigated 
under the appropriate state law. U.S. v. Mitchell (1971) 304 U.S. 64 (quoting Burnet v. 
Harmel, (1932) 287 U.S. 103). 
3
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Code, IS California "recognizes a general personal right to be pro-
tected from defamation. In contrast, California law also provides 
for related torts of disparagrement or trade libel that will rem-
edy an attack on the quality of the plaintiff's products or ser-
vices. "14 The court pointed out that all defamatory statements 
attack a person's character, and that the injury should not be 
confused with the consequences that may flow from a defama-
tory attack.16 The most probative evidence of the extent of the 
injury suffered by an individual may be the violence of the non-
personal consequences of a defamatory statement, but that evi-
dence should not be allowed to define the nature of the injury. 
The court concluded that compensatory damages received in 
defamation actions were excludable from gross income under 
section 104(a)(2). 
The court also determined that the punitive damages re-
~eived by Roemer were not taxable. The court noted that an 
amount awarded as punitive damages is generally includable in 
gross income as ordinary income.16 However, the court, relying 
on Revenue Ruling 75-45,17 pointed out that it has been the 
Commissioner's policy to interpret section 104(a)(2) to exclude 
both compensatory and punitive damages received when there 
has been a personal injury. Thus; since Roemer's compensatory 
damages were excludable, the punitive damages were also 
excludable.18 . 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis, defamation awards, both 
compensatory and punitive, will be excluded from gross income 
13. California Civil Code section 43. 
14. 716 F.2d at 699. 
15. Some injuries that may result are the loss of reputation in the community and 
any resulting loss of income, impairment of personal and professional relationships, loss 
of business opportunity. 
16. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
17. 1975-1 C.B. 47. 
18. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that litigation expenses in a litigation action 
are not deductible under I.R.C. § 212, because the expenses were not paid for the pro-
duction of income. However, the court applied its origin of the claim litigated standard 
to amount of reimbursed expenses, and concluded since the expenses were incurred be-
cause of a personal injury, they should be excluded from gross income as well. 716 F.2d 
at 700. 
4
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under section 104(a)(2), provided that the applicable statute rec-
ognizes defamation as a personal action. Because it is often diffi-
cult to draw distinctions between disparaging and defamatory 
statements, the choice of action will rest with the injured 
plaintiff. 
B. I.R.C. Section l04a(2) and Lump Sum Personal Injury 
Awards 
In Niles v. United States, l the Ninth Circuit held that the 
IRS may not allocate any portion of a lump-sum personal injury 
award to disallQw the deduction of future medical expenses 
under I.R.C. § 213(a).2 
In 1970, Kelly Niles was injured in a playground accident. 
Subsequent negligent medical treatment left him with irrepara-
ble brain damage. As a result, Niles, a quadriplegic, will require 
continuing medical and physical care throughout his life. 
A personal injury suit recovered a lump-sum jury award of 
$4,025,000.8 The defendants appealed, contending that the 
award was excessive. On appeal, Niles' counsel presented "a de-
tailed, hypothetical itemization of the award, allocating 
$1,588,176 to future medical expenses"· to rebut the challenge of 
excessiveness. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the jury's 
1. 710 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Choy, J.; the other members of the panel were 
Duniway and Alarcon, JJ.). 
2. Section 213(a)(1976)(amended 1983) provides that: 
There shall be allowed as a deduction the following 
amounts, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise-
(1) the amount by which the amount of the expenses 
paid during the taxable year (reduced by any amount deducti-
ble under paragraph (2) for medical carte of the taxpayer, his 
spouse, and dependents (as defined in section 152) exceeds 3 
percent of the adjusted gross income, and 
(2) an amount (not exceeding $150) equal to one-half of 
the expenses paid during the taxable year for insurance which 
constitutes medical care for the taxpayer, his spouse, and 
dependents. 
3. 710 F.3d at 1392. Although at trial Niles' counsel presented evidence as to each 
specific portion of Niles' total economic loss, the jury was not requested to specifically 
allocate any portion of the award. If such an allocation to future medical expenses had 
been made, then under Rev. Rul. 75-232, 1975-1 C.B. 941 the expenses would have been 
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award. II 
Niles excluded the full amount of the award from his gross 
income because under I.R.C. § 104(a) (2)6 personal injury awards 
from a jury or by settlement is non-taxable. 
In 1975, Niles took a medical deduction for his ongoing 
medical expenses. The IRS, attempting to change its long stand-
ing policy of not allocating lump-sum personal injury awards, 
disallowed the deduction.' Instead, adopting Niles' hypothetical 
apportionment of $1,588,176 for the cost of future medical ser-
vices, the IRS concluded that that portion of the award repre-
sented compensation under I.R.C. § 213(a). Therefore, the Ser-
vice ruled that Niles could not deduct future medical expenses 
under 213(a) until the aggregate accrued amount of expenses ex-
ceeded $1,588,176. The IRS reasoned that a contrary interpreta-
tion would allow Niles to receive a deduction on monies already 
excluded from gross income which would allow him to gain a 
double tax benefit.8 
Niles paid the assessed deficiency and sued for a tax refund 
in federal district court.9 At trial, the court granted summary 
judgment for Niles, and held that the IRS had no authority to 
allocate a portion of a lump-sum jury award to future medical 
expenses, because the allocation could not be accomplished with 
reasonable certainty.lo The IRS appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the Ser-
vice's attempt to allocate the lump-sum award was without stat-
5. Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230 (1974). 
6. Section 104 (a)(2)(1976)(amended 1983) in relevant part provides that: 
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in ex-
cess 00 deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to 
medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross in-
come does not include . . . the amount of damages received 
(whether liy suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries 
or sickness. 
7. The IRS also asserted income tax deficiencies for the years 1973, 1974 and 1976. 
Prior to the start of litigation the parties resolved their differences, so those issues were 
not before the court. 710 F.2d at 1392. 
8.Id. 
9. Niles v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 808 (N.D.Cal. 1981). 
10. 520 F. Supp. at 814-815. 
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utory authority or prior case law.l1 Historically, it has never 
been the practice of the IRS to apportion part of a personal in-
jury lump-sum award to future medical expenses.12 The court 
stated that "the nonallocability of lump-sum awards . . . has 
been a basic presumption of litigants in thousands of personal 
injury suits over t~e years."13 The court stressed that it looked 
disfavorably on the Service's administrative attempts to change 
firmly entrenched tax principles, particularly by "ajudication in 
a particular audit."14 
The IRS contended that its prior practice of nonallocation 
was justified because of the speculative nature of the lump-sum 
personal injury awards. However, the Service attempted to dis-
tinguish this case by arguing that allocation would not be specu-
lative since it could be based on the apportionment used by 
Niles' counsel to defend the reasonableness of the award. In de-
nying the Service's contention, the court noted that such a dis-
tinction would require unequal tax treatment based only upon 
the success of a taxpayer's attorney in defending a personal in-
jury award. 111 The court concluded that the differing tax treat-
ment would be without rational foundation. 
Even if such disparate tax treatment could be justified, the 
court pointed out that the Niles award was still speculative. The 
inquiry must be focused on what did the jury mean to allocate to 
future medical expenses. The Court noted that the mere defense 
of an award by an attorney on appeal provides no proof of the 
amount a jury intended to allocate as future medical expenses. IS 
Further, the Ninth Circuit suggested a number of ramifica-
11. 710 F.2d at 1393. The court noted that although Rev. Rul. 79-427, 1979-2 C.B. 
120 specifically addressed the issues in this case, that it would be improper to rely on the 
ruling since it was based on the facts of Niles and was promulgated during the pendency 
of the audit. 710 F.2d at 1393 n.3 12. 
12. 710 F.2d at 1393-94. See Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92 (1922) (there can be no correct 
estimate of the value of invaded rights); Letter Rulings 620731480A (1962) and 
6510284440A (1965) (Taxpayers may deduct future medical expenses when lump-sum 
damage award or unallocated settlement is received on account of a personal injury). Id. 
at 1394 n.4. 
13. Id. at 1394. 
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tions of permitting the IRS to allocate lump-sum personal injury 
awards. First, the federal courts would be forced to determine 
whether the Service's allocation correlated with the jury's intent 
in awarding the appropriate measure of damages. The court 
feared that there would also be an abundance of refund suits 
whenever the IRS attempted to apportion a previous lump-sum 
award. A second possible result would be that plaintiffs in per-
sonal injury actions would deliberately give vague and specula-
tive estimates of future medical expenses to escape IRS appor-
tionment of an award. Finally, the court expressed concern that 
if the IRS was permitted to allocate awards, plaintiffs would fo-
rum shop, selecting a forum in which the most favorable tax in-
formation regarding the taxability of awards might be conveyed 
to jurors. 17 
The Ninth Circuit held that a taxpayer's medical expenses 
are not compensated for by any part of a' previous lump-s'um 
personal injury award. In reaching this narrow conclusion, the 
court acknowledged that Niles would be receiving a double tax . 
benefit that had been sanctioned by historical IRS practices. 
The court determined that Congress, and not the IRS or the ju-
diciary, should be responsible for redefining a long-standing ad-
ministrative practice.18 
Laurie Ann Hedrich* 
17. [d. at 1395. 
18. [d. at 1395, quoting in part United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1984. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss1/12
